Restoring Legal Aid to the Poor: A Call to End Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions by Diller, Rebekah & Savner, Emily
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 36 | Number 4 Article 3
2009
Restoring Legal Aid to the Poor: A Call to End
Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions
Rebekah Diller
Emily Savner
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebekah Diller and Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid to the Poor: A Call to End Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions, 36 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 687 (2009).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol36/iss4/3
Restoring Legal Aid to the Poor: A Call to End Draconian and Wasteful
Restrictions
Cover Page Footnote
The authors are, respectively, a Deputy Director and Research Associate within the Justice Program of the
Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol36/iss4/3
DILLER_CHRISTENSEN 6/8/2009 8:39:53 PM 
 
687 
RESTORING LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR:  A 
CALL TO END DRACONIAN AND WASTEFUL 
RESTRICTIONS 
Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner∗ 
Introduction ...............................................................................................688 
  I.  LSC: Committed to the American Promise of Equal Justice ..............690 
  II.  The LSC Restriction Regime .............................................................691 
A. 1996 Restrictions Sharply Curtail Advocacy Available to 
Poor Clients. ............................................................................692 
B. Extraordinary, Poison Pill Restriction Is out of Step with 
Private-Public Partnership Model............................................693 
  III.  The LSC Restrictions Obstruct Justice for Low-Income 
Individuals and Waste Scarce Funds ..............................................695 
A. Limits on Advocacy Tools Available to Low-Income 
Clients Obstruct Equal Justice. ................................................695 
1. Attorneys’ Fee Award Restriction .....................................696 
2. Class Action Restriction ....................................................700 
3. Legislative and Administrative Advocacy Restriction ......701 
B. Restrictions on Unpopular Clients Render Courts Off-
Limits for the Most Vulnerable. ..............................................702 
1. Immigrant Representation Restriction ...............................703 
2. Prisoner Representation Restriction...................................704 
C. The Restriction on Non-LSC Funds Wastes Precious Funds 
and Unfairly Burdens State and Local Efforts to Expand 
Access to Justice......................................................................705 
1. Non-LSC Funds Restriction Is out of Step with the 
Government’s Approach to Public-Private Partnerships. ..705 
2. Restriction on Non-LSC Funds Interferes with 
Growing State and Local Efforts to Expand Access to 
Justice. ...............................................................................707 
3. Restrictions Waste Precious Resources that Could Go 
Toward Serving More Clients............................................708 
Conclusion .................................................................................................710 
 
∗ The authors are, respectively, a Deputy Director and Research Associate within the Justice 
Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law. 
DILLER_CHRISTENSEN 6/8/2009  8:39:53 PM 
688 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
INTRODUCTION 
As the burgeoning economic crisis pushes growing numbers of Ameri-
cans into poverty and homelessness, the need to revitalize the civil legal aid 
system is more urgent than ever.  For low-income families, a civil legal aid 
lawyer can be a lifeline to preserve a home against foreclosure by a preda-
tory lender, recover back wages from a cheating employer, or secure suffi-
cient food for a sick child.  Studies have shown that access to a lawyer can 
be the critical boost that families need to avoid homelessness and the key 
factor that domestic violence survivors need to achieve physical safety and 
financial security.1 
Notwithstanding the clear benefits, the overwhelming majority of low-
income people who need legal aid cannot obtain it, in large part due to po-
litical attacks that have compromised the Legal Services Corporation 
(“LSC”), the cornerstone of the nation’s institutional commitment to equal 
justice.2  Every year, one million cases are turned away by LSC-funded of-
fices due to funding shortages.3  Study after study finds that 80% of the 
civil legal needs of low-income people go unmet.4  On average, every legal 
aid attorney funded by LSC and other sources serves 6861 people.5  In con-
trast, there is one private attorney for every 525 people in the general popu-
lation.6  This “justice gap” keeps families in poverty and threatens the sta-
bility of our court system. 
The justice gap is not soley a product of funding shortages; it is also the 
result of extreme and ill-conceived funding restrictions imposed on legal 
aid programs by Congress in 1996.7  In an effort to deprive the low-income 
 
 1. See Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic 
Violence, 21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 158, 169 (2003); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of 
Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court:  Results 
of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 429 (2001); see also Rebecca L. 
Sandefur, Elements of Expertise: Lawyers’ Impact on Civil Trial and Hearing Outcomes 3 
(Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Brennan Center) (concluding that 
“lawyer-represented cases are more than 5-times more likely to prevail in adjudication than 
cases with self-represented litigants.”). 
 2. What is LSC, http://www.lsc.gov/about/lsc.php (last visited April 12, 2009) [herein-
after What is LSC] (noting that LSC is “the single largest provider of civil legal aid for the 
poor in the nation”). 
 3. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:  THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 5 (2005) [hereinafter JUSTICE 
GAP]. 
 4. Id. at 14. 
 5. Id. at 17. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 104 (2004) (noting that the “current le-
gal aid structure denies assistance to the politically unpopular groups who are least able to 
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clients of LSC-funded programs of full legal representation, Congress re-
stricted the advocacy tools available to LSC clients.  Clients of programs 
that receive LSC funds are denied access to the full range of legal tools 
available to people who have private lawyers, such as participating in class 
actions, claiming court-ordered attorneys’ fee awards, and pursuing legisla-
tive and administrative advocacy.8  Second, Congress made some catego-
ries of individuals ineligible for legal services representation; all undocu-
mented immigrants, certain categories of documented immigrants, and 
people in prison simply cannot qualify.9  Finally, Congress imposed an ex-
traordinarily harsh, “poison pill” restriction on LSC-funded programs that 
extends the federal funding restrictions to limit all the activities conducted 
on behalf of clients of LSC programs, even when funded by non-LSC 
funds.10 
In the thirteen years that have passed since the restrictions were pushed 
through the Congress as part of the Gingrich-era “Contract with America,” 
the restrictions have denied countless people equal access to justice.  They 
have prevented victims of predatory lenders from obtaining their full meas-
ure of justice.  They have contributed to the widespread abuse of immigrant 
laborers, including those legally in the United States, at their employers’ 
invitation.  Further, by shutting down legislative advocacy, they have pre-
vented legislators from learning about the legitimate concerns of low-
income communities. 
The most draconian aspect of the restrictions—the poison pill restriction 
on non-LSC funds—has warped the civil legal aid delivery system and 
wasted precious public and private money that could go toward serving 
more clients.  In many states, justice planners have had to set up two, du-
plicative legal aid systems in order to ensure that state and other funds are 
not constrained by the non-LSC funds restriction.11  The result is that 
scarce funds must be spent on duplicate administrative costs—two rents, 
two copy machines, and two computer networks.  In other locations with 
less state funding for legal aid, there are no non-LSC-funded organizations 
 
do without it and blocks the strategies most likely to address the root causes of economic 
deprivation”). 
 8. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to 1321-56.  Congress has carried forward these 
restrictions each year by incorporating them in the annual appropriations rider for LSC. 
 9. See id. at 1321-56. 
 10. See id. § 504(a) (prohibiting any “entity” that engages in enumerated restricted ac-
tivities from receiving LSC funds). 
 11. See, e.g., Legal Aid Servs. of Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1187 
(D. Or. 2008); J.J. Sullivan et al.¸ An End to Redundancy?  CLS and PLA Anxiously Await 
Federal Court Ruling on Working Together, PHILA. LAW., Fall 2005, at 18, 18 (describing 
dual system set up in Philadelphia). 
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to perform the restricted work.  As a result, whole communities are un-
served.  Parts I and II of this Article survey the impact that the LSC restric-
tions have had on the ability of low-income clients to obtain justice.  Part 
III provides examples of the manifold harms that the Brennan Center has 
identified in its multi-year effort to educate the public and lawmakers about 
the damage caused by the restrictions.  Finally, it argues that now is the 
time for Congress to ease the restrictions to eliminate their worst effects. 
I.  LSC: COMMITTED TO THE AMERICAN PROMISE OF EQUAL JUSTICE 
LSC embodies the federal government’s most sustained effort to deliver 
on the oft-touted American promise of equal justice for all.12  Congress 
created LSC in 1974 to provide high-quality civil legal assistance to those 
unable to afford attorneys.13  By providing legal assistance, Congress 
aimed to promote equal access to the justice system, improve economic 
opportunities for low-income people, and reaffirm faith in the legal sys-
tem.14  LSC built on the federal government’s initial foray into funding 
civil legal services under the auspices of the Office of Equal Opportunity 
(“OEO”), which administered the Johnson Administration’s War on Pov-
erty programs in the late-1960s. 
LSC was structured not as a federal agency, but rather as a quasi-private, 
non-profit corporation to insulate it from the political battles that periodi-
cally enveloped the OEO legal services program.  It is governed by an 
eleven-person, bipartisan board of directors appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.15  LSC operates by providing grants to independ-
ent, local non-profit organizations, incorporated under local state law, that 
in turn provide direct legal services within their communities.16  LSC-
funded programs help nearly one million people a year.17  Those local non-
profit organizations determine their own priorities for service provision, 
taking into account the particular needs of the client communities they 
serve.18  Legal services offices handle cases concerning basic needs: family 
 
 12. As Deborah L. Rhode has succinctly phrased it, “‘[e]qual justice under law is one of 
America’s most proudly proclaimed and widely violated legal principles.”  RHODE, supra 
note 7, at 3. 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1977). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. § 2996c. 
 16. See id. § 2996e. 
 17. What is LSC, supra note 2. 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
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matters (38%), housing (23%), income maintenance (13%) and consumer 
issues (12%).19 
LSC is the single greatest source of funding for legal aid in the United 
States, but it is just one part of a three-pronged partnership that also in-
cludes state and local governmental institutions, and private donors.20  In 
2007, LSC provided more than $330 million in grants to 138 programs with 
more than 900 offices.21  In the same year, more than $490 million was re-
ceived by LSC programs from non-LSC sources: state and local govern-
ments, Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”) programs, founda-
tions and other private donors.22  The proportion of non-LSC funds 
possessed by LSC-recipient organizations has risen substantially since the 
restrictions were put in place, from 40.33% in 1996 to 58.1% in 2007;23 
however, recent declines in IOLTA funding and state budget shortfalls due 
to the national economic crisis may start to reverse that trend. 
II.  THE LSC RESTRICTION REGIME 
At the inception of LSC, Congress placed some restrictions on the activi-
ties of LSC-funded lawyers, but struck a balance that enabled individuals to 
perform essential legal work.24  For example, while some limits were im-
posed on tools of advocacy—class actions, for example, could only be un-
dertaken with the approval of a program director—they were not com-
pletely barred.25  Congress also banned certain participation in certain types 
of cases that reflected particular controversies of the time, including litiga-
tion related to military registration, desegregation, and attempts to procure 
a “non-therapeutic abortion.”26  However, LSC-recipient programs could 
 
 19. What is LSC, supra note 2. 
 20. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FACT BOOK 2007, at 8 (2008) 
[hereinafter FACT BOOK 2007], available at http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/factbook2007.pdf. 
 21. What is LSC, supra note 2. 
 22. FACT BOOK 2007, supra note 20, at 7. 
 23. Compare id. at 6, with LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 1996 LSC AND NON-LSC FUNDING 
[hereinafter 1996 LSC] (on file with the Brennan Center). 
 24. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POLICY, SE-
CURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 21 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/legal_aid_history 
_2007.pdf. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (1977).  Congress also prohibited recipients from using 
LSC and private funds to engage in administrative and legislative lobbying, unless such rep-
resentation was “necessary to the provision of legal advice and representation with respect 
to such client’s legal rights.”  Recipients were free to engage in lobbying with other non-
LSC government funds, such as funds from local and state governments, if the sources of 
those funds permitted such activities.  See id. § 2996h. 
 26. Id. § 2996f(b) 
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still represent clients in such cases if a state or local government funder 
wished to finance the effort.27  For the most part, Congress held true to its 
declaration set forth in the LSC Act that “attorneys providing legal assis-
tance must have full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients.”28 
A. 1996 Restrictions Sharply Curtail Advocacy Available to Poor 
Clients. 
The restrictions imposed in 1996 marked a clear departure from this bal-
ance by sharply curtailing advocacy on behalf of legal services clients.  The 
1996 restrictions were the culmination of attacks on indigent legal services 
that began soon after LSC’s formation.  Hostility came in large part from 
agribusiness interests in farm states, which were angered by the representa-
tion of farmworkers conducted by legal services offices.29  Ronald 
Reagan’s 1980 election provided an eager ally in the White House.  The 
Heritage Foundation’s conservative agenda, Mandate for Leadership, pub-
lished on the eve of President Reagan’s first term, detailed steps to take to 
eliminate LSC or, at least, to reduce its effectiveness.30  Declaring LSC “so 
basically flawed that it is beyond reform sufficient to justify its continua-
tion,” the plan called for the wholesale destruction of LSC.31  If complete 
elimination proved infeasible, the Heritage Foundation urged, steep budget 
cuts and broad restrictions (to be imposed through LSC appropriations rid-
ers) would be the second-best alternative.32 
LSC survived the attempts to eliminate it under the Reagan Administra-
tion, though with less funding.33  However, the blueprint for hobbling LSC 
was ultimately put in place during the 104th Congress, when Republicans 
took control of both houses for the first time in decades and, through the 
“Contract with America,” renewed the call for elimination of LSC.34  The 
House of Representatives, led by Newt Gingrich, adopted an initial budget 
that would have cut LSC funding by one-third for FY 1996, a second third 
 
 27. Id. § 2996h. 
 28. Id. § 2996(6). 
 29. See, e.g., Robert Hornstein et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1089, 1096 (2003); Editorial, A Brazen Assault on Legal Services, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 1990, at 22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/23/opinion/a-
brazen-assault-on-legal-services.html. 
 30. Alfred S. Regnery, Action, Legal Services Corporation and Community Services 
Administration, in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP, POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE 
ADMINISTRATION 1057, 1061-62, 1068 (Charles L. Heatherly ed., 1981). 
 31. Id. at 1061. 
 32. Id. 
 33. FACT BOOK 2007, supra note 20, at 7. 
 34. See HOUSEMAN, supra note 24, at 36. 
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for FY 1997, and then, eliminated all federal funding in the subsequent 
year.35  Through a compromise brokered by then-Senator Pete Domenici 
(R-NM) and others, the plan to entirely de-fund LSC was averted.36  In-
stead, Congress cut LSC’s appropriation by almost one-third and imposed a 
set of funding restrictions that severely limit the work that LSC-funded 
programs could do, including with the money they received from non-LSC 
sources.37 
Under the 1996 appropriations rider, which has been carried forward in 
subsequent years with only slight modification, non-profit organizations 
receiving LSC funds are barred from using the following tools of advocacy 
for their clients, even though such tools are available to individuals who are 
represented by privately funded attorneys: 
• class action litigation; 
• claims for attorneys’ fee awards; 
• most legislative and administrative advocacy; and 
• educating potential clients about their rights and then offering to 
represent them. 
The restrictions also prohibit LSC-funded organization from represent-
ing categories of clients, including: 
• incarcerated people; 
• undocumented immigrants, and certain documented immigrants; 
and 
• individuals facing eviction from public housing projects who are 
charged with a drug offense. 
Other restrictions include a ban on all abortion-related litigation and on 
redistricting cases.38 
B. Extraordinary, Poison Pill Restriction Is out of Step with Private-
Public Partnership Model. 
In a somewhat unprecedented power grab, Congress prohibited recipi-
ents from engaging in these restricted activities not just with LSC funds, 
but with any funds, no matter the source.39  Once an organization receives 
its first dollar of LSC funding, all of its funds from state and local govern-
ments, other federal programs, and private foundations and donors are re-
 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 36-37. 
 38. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53-1321-56. 
 39. See id. 
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stricted.40  Not only did this extension of federal power shift policy dra-
matically away from the balance struck in the LSC Act—which permitted 
recipients to use funds from other government sources for the purposes for 
which they were intended41—but the 1996 law also marked a stark depar-
ture from the usual model for federal grant-making.  It is fairly common for 
the federal government to restrict the activities it funds; however, it is ex-
tremely rare and raises grave constitutional concerns when Congress re-
stricts the activities that grantees choose to finance with their own, non-
federal funds. 
The 1996 restrictions faced almost immediate challenges in court on 
First Amendment grounds.  A federal district court in Hawaii ruled that the 
restriction on non-LSC funds violated the First Amendment because it did 
not afford a recipient non-profit any avenue through which to use non-LSC 
funds to engage in constitutionally protected speech and advocacy.42  In the 
wake of this ruling, LSC attempted to salvage the constitutionality of Con-
gress’s law by issuing a so-called “program integrity regulation.”43  Ac-
knowledging that the non-LSC funds restriction had overreached, LSC 
claimed that its regulation was intended to provide recipients with the op-
portunity to use their own non-LSC resources to finance the restricted ac-
tivities.44 
Yet, it is clear from the operation of the regulation that its real intent is 
to make it as difficult as possible for a recipient to use private funds to en-
gage in restricted representation.  To spend non-LSC funds on restricted 
work, grantees must operate a new organization out of a physically separate 
office, with separate staff and equipment.45  In practice, LSC’s program in-
tegrity regulation imposes conditions so onerous that almost no program in 
the country has been able to successfully rely on it to create a separate af-
filiate through which to conduct privately financed, restricted activities.46  
 
 40. See id. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 2996i(c) (1977). 
 42. Legal Aid Soc’y of Hawaii v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 
1997). 
 43. See 62 Fed. Reg. 27,695 (May 21, 1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1610) (de-
scribing history of the program integrity rule). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (1997). 
 46. Closing the Justice Gap: Providing Civil Legal Assistance to Low-Income Ameri-
cans:  Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Rebekah 
Diller), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3370&wit_id= 
7200. 
DILLER_CHRISTENSEN 6/8/2009  8:39:53 PM 
2009] RESTORING LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR 695 
The regulation continues to be the subject of ongoing litigation that chal-
lenges its impact on protected First Amendment activity.47 
III.  THE LSC RESTRICTIONS OBSTRUCT JUSTICE FOR LOW-INCOME 
INDIVIDUALS AND WASTE SCARCE FUNDS 
Over a decade of experience with the legal services restrictions has 
shown that they prevent people with pressing needs from obtaining full ac-
cess to the justice system.  They deny low-income people the legal tools 
available to those who can afford to pay for a lawyer.  They also exclude 
the politically disfavored—prisoners and certain immigrants—from access 
to representation and thereby access to the courts.  The restrictions constrict 
the choices available to state and local governments, as well as private 
foundations and individual donors, who wish to be partners in innovative 
efforts to expand access to justice.  Finally, they squander precious funds 
that could go toward representing more underserved clients. 
A. Limits on Advocacy Tools Available to Low-Income Clients 
Obstruct Equal Justice. 
Notwithstanding the restrictions, legal services offices continue to pro-
vide high-quality representation and assist client communities in addressing 
widespread legal problems.48  However, clients face many types of legal 
problems that could be addressed more effectively and efficiently were 
they to have access to the legal tools available to all other litigants.  This 
section describes the impact of particular advocacy restrictions—those pro-
hibiting attorneys’ fee awards, class actions, and legislative and administra-
tive advocacy—and includes specific case examples that the Brennan Cen-
ter has gathered from legal services offices around the country. 
 
 47. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 97 CV 00182, and Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., 
01 CV 8371 are two combined cases currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York.  The author is one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs 
in these challenges.  The current proceedings follow the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
on First Amendment grounds against the application of the physical separation requirement 
to three New York-based plaintiff legal aid organizations in 2004.  Velazquez v. Legal Ser-
vices Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit subsequently lifted the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court.  The Second Circuit ordered the district court to apply a different legal standard 
to determine whether the burdens imposed on the plaintiff legal services programs by the 
physical separation requirement effectively deny them adequate alternative channels 
through which to spend their non-LSC funds on the activities prohibited by the funding re-
strictions.  See Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
 48. See, e.g., Raun J. Rassmussen, Affirmative Litigation Under the Legal Services Cor-
poration Restrictions, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 428 (2000). 
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Many of the examples involve efforts to combat predatory lending and 
other consumer scams that are tied to the mortgage meltdown and foreclo-
sure crisis.  Legal aid providers have been inundated with requests for help 
by people about to lose their homes.49  The need is tremendous and the re-
sources available are limited.  When legal aid offices are able to take cases 
in which consumer fraud was involved,50 the restrictions—particularly the 
class action and attorneys’ fee restrictions—limit the ability of LSC recipi-
ents to perform their private attorney general role in the consumer protec-
tion enforcement scheme and enable wrongdoers to write off individual 
cases as a mere cost of doing business.51  Moreover, the restrictions on leg-
islative advocacy have gagged legal aid attorneys in their critical role in 
alerting legislatures to the problems of low-income communities, including 
those that led to the subprime lending crisis.52 
1. Attorneys’ Fee Award Restriction 
Much has been written about the role of attorneys’ fee award mecha-
nisms in encouraging private attorneys to take cases that vindicate impor-
tant social goals such as the elimination of discrimination.53  For cases in 
which legal services organizations represent clients, attorneys’ fees serve 
three related, and equally important, functions.  First, fees provide leverage 
within a litigation and encourage settlement.  Second, they act as a deter-
rent against the violation of laws that are designed to protect the public.  
Third, they enable legal aid programs to marshal additional revenue from 
non-LSC sources.54 
 
 49. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE ECONOMY AND CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES (2009), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_economy_and_civil_legal_services. 
 50. It is increasingly acknowledged that the subprime mortgage meltdown was not just 
the result of objective economic forces but also the product of fraud in the mortgage busi-
ness.  As Sen. Patrick Leahy recently stated when introducing a bill to help federal agencies 
crack down on mortgage and other financial fraud, law enforcement cannot keep pace with 
the number of complaints:  “suspicious activity reports alleging mortgage fraud that have 
been filed with the Treasury Department have increased more than tenfold, from about 
5,400 in 2002 to more than 60,000 in 2008.”  155 CONG. REC. S1679, S1682 (2009) (state-
ment of Sen. Leahy). 
 51. See Laura K. Abel, Lawyers for the Poor Muzzled in Subprime Mess, NATION, Jan. 
16, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080128/abel [hereinafter Abel, Lawyers]. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture:  Disarming the Pri-
vate Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183 (2003). 
 54. See, e.g., Duell v. Condon, 84 N.Y.2d 773, 780 (1995); Maplewood Mgmt. v. Best, 
533 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); CAL. LEGAL SERVS. COORDINATING 
COMM., CALIFORNIA STATE JUSTICE PLAN 2001:  RESPONSE TO LSC PROGRAM LETTER 2000–
1, at 32 (2001) [hereinafter CAL. LEGAL SERVS.]. 
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Fees play a critical role in consumer protection and mortgage fraud 
cases, in particular.  In all but five states, consumer protection statutes that 
prohibit deceptive practices permit prevailing plaintiffs to recover attor-
neys’ fees from defendants who have been found to have violated the 
law.55  On the federal level, the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), 
a tool for combating the racially discriminatory bias in much subprime 
lending, also provides for attorneys’ fee awards when a plaintiff has pre-
vailed.56  The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), which 
prohibits kickbacks to mortgage brokers, authorizes prevailing parties to 
obtain attorneys’ fees.57  In addition, fees are authorized under the Truth in 
Lending Act (“TILA”),58 which mandates certain disclosures in home eq-
uity lending, and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act,59 an 
amendment to TILA that mandates additional disclosures for high-cost 
home loans and prohibits certain loan terms such as negative amortization 
and balloon payments. 
The possibility of having to pay attorneys’ fees provides critical leverage 
to ensure that a better funded legal adversary does not drag out proceedings 
in an attempt to exhaust the legal aid lawyer’s resources.  As the New York 
Court of Appeals has stated, the availability of attorneys’ fees is “an incen-
tive to resolve disputes quickly and without undue expense” on the part of 
the court and litigants.60  Without the ability to level the litigation playing 
field, low-income litigants are placed at a disadvantage in the litigation and 
in settlement negotiations. 
LSC-funded South Brooklyn Legal Services (“SBLS”) has one of the na-
tion’s leading predatory lending practices.  It reports that the inability to 
seek fee awards frequently results in predatory lenders dragging out cases 
that might otherwise settle if fees were available to serve as an incentive to 
resolve the case before the investment of substantial attorney time.61  In 
one case against Ameriquest Mortgage Co., one of the nation’s largest 
 
 55. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN 
THE STATES:  A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 
STATUTES 21 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/issues/udap/content/UDAP_Report_ 
Feb09.pdf. 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2006) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevail-
ing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”). 
 57. 24 C.F.R. § 3500.21(f)(1)(iii) (2009). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2006). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006). 
 60. Duell v. Condon, 84 N.Y.2d 773, 780 (1995) (describing New York’s Real Property 
Law § 234, which permits tenants to obtain attorneys’ fees when a residential lease term 
permits landlords to collect fees). 
 61. Interview with Jessica Attie, Project Co-Dir., Foreclosure Prevention Project, S. 
Brooklyn Legal Servs. (Jan. 22, 2009). 
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predatory lenders, SBLS represented an elderly African-American widow 
who had been conned into an unaffordable mortgage when she needed to 
make repairs to her home of over twenty years.62  After meeting with 
Ameriquest representatives, this client received a 2/28 mortgage (a thirty-
year mortgage with two years at a fixed rate and twenty-eight years at an 
adjustable rate) with initial monthly payments of $2,300, nearly three times 
her monthly income.63  To make it appear as if she could afford the loan, 
Ameriquest allegedly created a fake set of financial documents to include 
in her loan file, including a 401(k) document, employment statement, lease 
agreement, and tax returns.64  With SBLS’s assistance, she brought a case 
alleging Fair Housing Act, Truth in Lending Act, Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act, New York Deceptive Practices Act and other violations.65 
In an attempt to prove that the company engaged in a pattern of extend-
ing unaffordable loans to borrowers, SBLS sought the lender’s loan files 
for other borrowers around New York.66  Ameriquest initially refused to 
turn over the documents and the company was able to draw out a lengthy 
court battle due to the severe mismatch in negotiating stances.67  Eventu-
ally, Ameriquest produced 50,000 pages of documents, which took two at-
torneys hundreds of hours to review and was an enormous drain on SBLS 
resources.68  The case eventually settled.69  Had SBLS been permitted to 
seek attorneys’ fees, Ameriquest might have had an incentive to limit the 
amount of time the plaintiffs’ attorneys had to spend on the case, thus, 
speeding up the litigation process.  Fees would have also given the SBLS 
client more leverage in settlement negotiations. 
The award of attorneys’ fees also serves a deterrent purpose.  For exam-
ple, it ensures that wrongdoers suffer some additional financial penalty for 
violating a consumer protection or civil rights statute and cannot merely 
write off the costs incurred in the litigation as a cost of doing business.  
When low-income victims of such violations cannot seek fee awards, how-
ever, that purpose is frustrated.  As new “foreclosure consultant” scams—
in which unsavory “consultants” make money by falsely promising to help 
distressed homeowners refinance or otherwise reduce their mortgage 
 
 62. Complaint at 1, Overton v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. et al., No. 05-CV-4715 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2005). 
 63. Id. at 7. 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Interview with Jessica Attie, supra note 61. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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debt—appear with alarming regularity, the fee restriction hampers efforts 
to shut them down. 
LSC-funded Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (“LAFLA”) esti-
mates that as many as 30% to 40% of homeowners contacting its office last 
year for foreclosure-related assistance had either already paid a foreclosure 
consultant or had been contacted by one.70  To protect homeowners and en-
sure that they are informed of their rights, California law regulates the prac-
tices of mortgage foreclosure consultants.71  Even with this law on the 
books, LAFLA reports that some consultants illegally provide little or no 
services and divert the homeowner from seeking legitimate assistance.  In 
many cases against deceitful foreclosure consultants, actual damages would 
be in the range of $1,500 to $2,500, but this small amount limits the effec-
tiveness and feasibility of litigation.72  Despite the statutory provision for 
attorneys’ fees in the California law, there are inadequate resources avail-
able among those entities that could pursue fees, including the private bar 
and criminal prosecutors, to fight these predatory consultants.  If LAFLA 
could seek fees in these cases, they could raise the consultants’ costs of 
continuing these illegal practices, perhaps high enough to put them out of 
business. 
Attorneys’ fees also deter wrongful conduct by individuals who flout 
court orders.  In one aspect of LSC-funded Legal Aid of West Virginia’s 
practice, staff attorneys and volunteer private attorneys represent victims of 
domestic violence who seek protective orders.73  However, when an abuser 
repeatedly flouts court orders, the victim cannot seek attorneys’ fees to de-
ter such flagrant and dangerous violations of the law. 
Finally, the attorneys’ fee restriction cuts off a key fundraising mecha-
nism that would permit programs to bring in added funds to serve more cli-
ents.  The California Legal Services Commission has observed that in addi-
tion to impeding successful case resolutions, the attorneys’ fee award 
restriction creates serious funding problems for LSC grantees.74  Prior to 
the restriction’s enactment, LSC-funded organizations in California recov-
ered approximately $1.75 million annually in attorneys’ fees, a revenue 
source no longer available to them.75 
 
 70. Memorandum from Dorothy Herrera Settlage, Legal Aid Found. of L.A., to Dennis 
Rockway, Legal Aid Found. of L.A. (Jan. 26, 2009) (on file with the Brennan Center). 
 71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2945(c)(1) (West 1980). 
 72. Memorandum from Dorothy Herrera Settlage, supra note 70. 
 73. Interview with Adrienne Worthy, Executive Dir. of Legal Aid of W. Va. (April 15, 
2009). 
 74. CAL. LEGAL SERVS. COORDINATING COMM., supra note 54, at 32. 
 75. Id. 
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2. Class Action Restriction 
Class actions provide courts and litigants with an efficient mechanism 
for adjudicating the similar claims of a group and ensure that similarly situ-
ated persons obtain relief when a defendant violates the law.  They also 
provide access to the courts for individuals who might not have the re-
sources to bring an individual claim.  In some cases, the availability of a 
class action ensures that broad discovery can take place as to a defendant’s 
unlawful actions. 
For low-income people in particular, the availability of class actions is 
critical for obtaining relief from widespread, illegal practices.76  Histori-
cally, class actions by legal services programs ensured that poor children 
obtained medical coverage,77 forced the Social Security Administration to 
abide by court rulings,78 and challenged consumer fraud.79  Access to jus-
tice and legal services commissions in Georgia, Hawaii, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, and North Carolina have concluded that the inability to use the 
class action mechanism hinders legal services offices from providing the 
best possible services to their clients.80  As the North Carolina Legal Ser-
vices Planning Council has concluded, challenging some “illegal but wide-
spread practices” without a class action lawsuit is “impossible.”81 
As with the attorneys’ fee restriction, the class action limitation has a 
particularly harmful effect on efforts to combat consumer fraud that targets 
low-income communities.  In predatory lending cases, for example, legal 
services programs must litigate against unscrupulous players piecemeal, 
helping one homeowner at a time instead of a broad class of victims.  A re-
cent suit by eight first-time homebuyers against United Homes, LLC, a 
self-titled “one-stop shop” of real estate companies, lenders, appraisers, and 
lawyers, illustrates the inability of the courts to fully enforce consumer pro-
 
 76. See Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class:  A Practical Approach 
to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 
10-14 (2005). 
 77. See id. at 11 (describing case brought by the Tennessee Justice Center). 
 78. See David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions:  Lawyers in Florida, New York, 
Virginia and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337, 340-41 (1998). 
 79. See id. at 347. 
 80. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REPORTS FROM EIGHTEEN STATES HAVE IDENTIFIED 
FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS AS A BARRIER TO JUSTICE (2009), available at http://brennan.3cdn. 
net/f4c6618922cc8c403e_0hm6bns0j.pdf. 
 81. N.C. LEGAL SERVS. PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTH CAROLINA STATEWIDE LEGAL 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT 2003, at 49 (2003), available at https://www.legalaidnc.org/Pub-
lic/Participate/Legal_Services_Community/Planning_Council/NC%20Statewide%20Needs 
%20Assessment%2003%2024%2003.pdf. 
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tection laws without the option of a class action.82  Represented by SBLS, 
the eight African-American homebuyers allege that United Homes con-
spired with appraisers, lenders, and attorneys to sell “over-valued, defective 
homes financed with predatory loans.”83  They allege that United Homes 
failed to disclose their properties’ histories, inflated the homes’ values with 
inaccurate appraisals, overstated the buyers assets and incomes on loan ap-
plications, concealed information about loan terms, sold the homes in unin-
habitable conditions, and refused to make agreed-upon repairs.84  The 
homebuyers also allege that “United Homes exploited the racially segre-
gated housing market to engage in ‘reverse redlining,’ the practice of inten-
tionally extending credit to members of minority communities on unfair 
terms.”85  The bulk of the plaintiffs’ claims have survived a motion to dis-
miss and the case continues.86  Given the alleged nature of this “one-stop 
shop,” it is hard to imagine that these eight plaintiffs are the only low-
income individuals in Brooklyn who have fallen victim.  However, unable 
to file a class action against United Homes, SBLS cannot seek more wide-
spread relief for other homebuyers potentially taken advantage of by 
United Homes. 
3. Legislative and Administrative Advocacy Restriction 
Low-income people are at a distinct disadvantage in raising their con-
cerns before legislative and administrative bodies.  They lack the lobbyists, 
trade associations, and monetary donations that provide corporate and other 
well-resourced interests access to the political process.  At the same time, 
their daily lives are often inextricably linked with the operations of gov-
ernment and law.87 
Legal aid attorneys who see the legal problems faced by low-income 
communities on a daily basis can play a critical role in alerting legislatures 
and other government bodies to gaps in regulation and problems in the im-
plementation of laws.  The silencing of legal aid attorneys has had dire 
 
 82. Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., 2007 WL 2437810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007). 
 83. Id. at *1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *2. 
 86. Id. at *23. 
 87. See generally Barbara Gault et al., Prospects for Low-Income Mothers’ Economic 
Survival Under Welfare Reform, 28 PUBLIUS 175 (2008) (describingthe  effects of welfare 
reform laws and policies on low-income mothers); Christopher Mazzeo et al., Work-First or 
Work-Only:  Welfare Reform, State Policy, and Access to Postsecondary Education, 586 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 144 (2003) (describing the effects of welfare reform 
and state implementation on educational attainment of low-income people). 
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consequences in the current mortgage crisis.88  Attorneys at Maryland Le-
gal Aid Bureau (“MDLAB”), for example, have witnessed many of the 
lending abuses that have occurred over the last ten years, but restrictions on 
legislative and administrative advocacy have prevented them from actively 
pursuing reforms.89  Under the restrictions, the only way that a legal aid of-
fice can participate in lobbying is in response to a written request from a 
lawmaker.90  Because few lawmakers are aware of this limitation and rarely 
invite the participation of legal services lawyers in legislative discussions, 
this highly unusual requirement most often shuts down communication en-
tirely.91 
In contrast, when MDLAB has been able to educate lawmakers about the 
problems faced by its clients—at a lawmaker’s invitation, as required by 
the restrictions—it has lent a critical, non-mortgage-industry voice to the 
process.  In 2008, the Maryland Legislature dramatically overhauled state 
laws regarding credit and lending processes.92  Because of a lawmaker’s 
invitation, a MDLAB attorney was able to participate in a state Senate Fi-
nance Committee workgroup on revising consumer protection safeguards 
that was otherwise composed of representatives from the lending, mort-
gage, and banking industries.93  The MDLAB attorney was the only person 
in the workgroup positioned to represent the interests of borrowers.94  Input 
from this attorney ensured that the proposed consumer protections were not 
unduly limited to the most extreme types of loan products, as the industry 
representatives had proposed, and resulted in a more wide-ranging con-
sumer protection bill being passed by the Legislature. 
B. Restrictions on Unpopular Clients Render Courts Off-Limits for 
the Most Vulnerable. 
Reflecting the political winds of the time, the 1996 restrictions prohib-
ited legal services attorneys from representing many categories of immi-
 
 88. Abel, Lawyers, supra note 51. 
 89. Interview with Kathleen Skullney, Project Att’y, Foreclosure Legal Assistance Pro-
ject, Legal Aid Bureau (Feb. 23, 2009). 
 90. See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.6 (1997). 
 91. Abel, Lawyers, supra note 51. 
 92. See, e.g., Andy Rosen, Foreclosure Reform Bills Take Stage in Maryland Legisla-
ture, DAILY REC., Feb. 6, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20080206/ 
ai_n21226608. 
 93. Interview with Kathleen Skullney, supra note 89. 
 94. Id. 
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grants and all prisoners.95  These exclusions have further marginalized 
those with the least access to the civil justice system.96 
1. Immigrant Representation Restriction 
For certain categories of immigrants, including many who are lawfully 
in the United States, the restriction places legal representation out of reach 
even when the stakes are high.  In many parts of the country, there are no 
non-LSC-funded legal aid offices that can serve undocumented and other 
excluded immigrants.97  As a result, they have no place to turn when they 
face unlawful eviction, consumer fraud, or an employer who has cheated 
them out of wages. 
One of the groups hardest hit by the immigrant restriction are those mi-
grant workers here in the United States at their employer’s invitation on H-
2B visas, a visa category for unskilled, non-agricultural workers perform-
ing seasonal or temporary jobs.  H-2B visa holders were excluded from le-
gal aid eligibility in 1996.98  Last year, Congress eased the restriction 
slightly and made H-2B visa holders working in the forestry industry eligi-
ble for legal aid.99  However, H-2B workers employed in other industries, 
such as construction, canning and tourism, remain ineligible.100 
H-2B workers often perform tasks that risk physical harm and frequently 
are mistreated by employers.101  Many do not speak English and work in 
geographically isolated areas.102  Without access to legal services, they are 
virtually without recourse when their rights are violated.  Employers often 
take advantage of this fact by misclassifying agricultural workers as H-2B 
 
 95. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a)(11), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to 1321-55. 
 96. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 115-16. 
 97. See, e.g., THE LEGAL AID SAFETY NET:  A REPORT ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME ILLINOISANS 170, 181 (2005), available at http://www.equaljusticeillinois.org/docs/ 
LegalNeeds.pdf (describing lack of non-LSC-funded legal aid organizations outside urban 
centers of the state). 
 98. See § 504(a)(11). 
 99. See Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp., Temporary Forestry Workers Now Eligible 
for LSC-Funded Services (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.lsc.gov/press/updates_ 
2008_detail_T220_R0.php. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border, 
Security, and International Law Membership of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2008) (statement of George Miller, Chairman of the Education and Labor Comm.), avail-
able at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller080416.pdf. 
 102. See MARY BAUER, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY:  GUESTWORKER PRO-
GRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (2007), available at http://www.splcenter.org/pdf/static/ 
Close_to_Slavery.pdf. 
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workers, when these workers should fall under the relatively more stringent 
protections of the H-2A visa program.103 
LSC-funded Texas RioGrande Legal Aid has described a number of 
cases in which it had to turn away exploited H-2B workers.104  One case 
involved an “illegal guestworker importation scheme” in which a grower 
and two farm labor contractors used over 400 H-2B workers to harvest and 
pack onions and watermelons from 2001–2007 in south and west Texas to 
circumvent the protections and benefits of the H-2A program, including ac-
cess to LSC-funded representation.105  TRLA was unable to represent any 
of the H-2B visa holders, even though there was reason to believe that they 
had been abused at the hands of their employer.106 
2. Prisoner Representation Restriction 
Legal services organizations are prohibited from representing anyone in 
prison.107  This restriction has hampered efforts to resolve civil legal issues, 
such as those related to debt and child custody, that can help persons in 
prison prepare for reentry into their communities.  In some parts of the 
country, the restriction has left those in prison with virtually no access to 
civil legal representation.108 
Michigan, for example, has a bold and innovative Prisoner Reentry Ini-
tiative that aims to help incarcerated people as they prepare to reenter soci-
ety.109  A team of community groups, faith-based organizations, and legal 
services providers stands ready to provide essential services.110  An impor-
tant component of this project is “in-reach”; going into prisons and jails to 
address the problems confronting these men and women prior to release.111  
 
 103. See Do Federal Programs Ensure U.S. Workers Are Recruited First Before Employ-
ers Hired From Abroad?:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th 
Cong. 90 (2008) (statement of Javier Riojas, Branch Manager, Tex. RioGrande Legal Aid), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_ 
hearings&docid=f:41982.wais. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a)(15). 
 108. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 7, at 116; THE 2007 ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL LEGAL 
NEEDS AND BARRIERS OF LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME PEOPLE IN HAWAI’I II-24 (2007) 
[hereinafter THE 2007 ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.hsba.org/resources/1/ 
Documents/Access%20to%20Justice.pdf. 
 109. Mich. Prison Reentry Initiative, The Three-Phase, Decision-Point MPRI Model, 
http://www.michpri.com/index.php?page=how-it-works (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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But, even though this Michigan initiative is primarily funded with state and 
private money, legal services programs, such as the Reentry Law Project of 
LSC-funded Legal Aid of Western Michigan—a key legal player on the 
team—are barred from providing services to anyone in a prison.112  The 
Reentry Law Project, for example, can only assist individuals once re-
leased, even though many of the problems facing prisoners would be better 
addressed during incarceration, so that citizens can move immediately into 
employment and housing upon release.113  For example, many prisoners 
face the loss of custody of their children while incarcerated and would 
benefit greatly from the help of an attorney as they struggle to maintain 
family relationships.114 
In states that lack other funding or organizations designed to assist those 
in prison, the restriction has meant that legal representation is effectively 
out of reach.  For example, in Hawaii, where the incarcerated population 
grew 138% from 1990–2006, the ACLU of Hawaii is the “only legal ser-
vice agency with the potential to assist the inmate population; however, due 
to their limited resources they only accept cases which would result in a 
larger impact on the overall corrections system.”115 
C. The Restriction on Non-LSC Funds Wastes Precious Funds and 
Unfairly Burdens State and Local Efforts to Expand Access to Justice. 
The most draconian aspect of the LSC restrictions is the application of 
this entire set of limits to all of the state, local, private and other non-LSC 
funds possessed by LSC recipients.  This punitive measure subjects legal 
services offices to a more stringent regime than almost any other federal 
grantee.  It has interfered with efforts at the state level to leverage resources 
for the efficient and effective provision of legal aid.  Finally, in a field no-
toriously under-resourced, the restriction on non-LSC funds has wasted 
precious dollars and driven away private funding opportunities. 
1. Non-LSC Funds Restriction Is out of Step with the Government’s 
Approach to Public-Private Partnerships. 
The restriction on non-LSC funds, and program integrity regulation that 
implements the restriction, are out of step with the traditional model for 
public-private partnerships.  Non-profit organizations that receive part of 
 
 112. See § 504(a)(15). 
 113. Interview with Miriam Aukerman, Reentry Law Project Dir., Legal Aid of W. Mich. 
(April 15, 2009). 
 114. Id. 
 115. THE 2007 ASSESSMENT, supra note 108, at II-24. 
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their funding from LSC are treated more stringently than almost all other 
government-funded non-profits, including faith-based organizations.116  
Other non-profits must account strictly for their receipt of government 
funds, but are not forced to operate dual systems out of separate offices in 
order to use their private funds to engage in constitutionally protected ac-
tivities.117 
LSC has defended this “physical separation” model in court by claiming 
that such stringent separation is necessary to ensure that it does not indi-
rectly subsidize or appear to endorse the disfavored, restricted activities, 
such as representation of undocumented immigrants or class actions.118  
However, that claim is belied by the fact that faith-based organizations that 
receive government funds are subject to a much more relaxed separation 
regime.119  The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause bars the federal 
government from subsidizing or endorsing a religious grantee’s religious 
activities.120  Yet, under the current federal Faith-Based Initiative, the gov-
ernment allows religious organizations to rely on a single staff to run feder-
ally funded, non-religious programs in a single physical space in which the 
organizations conduct privately financed religious activities such as wor-
ship and proselytization.121  The government has asserted that such a mod-
est level of separation is good enough to avoid subsidization as well as the 
appearance of endorsing a privately funded religious message.122  The dis-
parity in treatment with legal services programs is particularly striking 
since the Constitution’s Establishment Clause actually forbids governmen-
tal endorsement of a religious message, whereas the Constitution does not 
require the government to distance itself from the provision of legal repre-
 
 116. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular No. A-122:  Cost Principles for Non-Profit 
Organizations, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a122/a122.html (set-
ting forth accounting requirements for recipients of federal grants). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 119. Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002); WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 
OF FAITH-BASED & CMTY. INITIATIVES, GUIDANCE TO FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY 
ORGANIZATIONS ON PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2002) [hereinafter 
FAITH-BASED], available at www.ethicsinstitute.com/pdf/Faith%20Based%20Federal%20 
Grants.pdf.  This Article takes no position on whether the Faith-Based Initiative enables the 
government to fulfill its constitutional obligations. 
 120. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (“[O]ur cases have prohibited 
government endorsement of religion, its sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, 
whether or not citizens were coerced to conform.”). 
 121. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141; FAITH-BASED, supra note 119. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141; FAITH-BASED, supra note 119. 
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sentation and, indeed, in some cases may even require government to pro-
vide representation.123 
The punitive nature of LSC’s physical separation regime is further un-
derscored by contrasting it with the more reasonable rules applied in 2002 
to federally funded stem cell research.  Scientists using private funds to 
conduct research on federally proscribed stem cell lines were required, for 
years, to operate two entirely separate labs, one for their privately funded 
research, another for their publicly funded research.124  In 2002, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health found this restriction so expensive, inefficient, 
and contrary to principles of scientific research that it removed the restric-
tion.125  The NIH permitted government-funded scientists to conduct pri-
vately funded stem cell research alongside federally funded research, in a 
single lab, so long as they use rigorous bookkeeping methods to ensure that 
any restricted stem cell experiments are financed exclusively with private 
dollars.126  LSC-funded organizations should be placed on a level playing 
field with these and other federal grantees. 
2. Restriction on Non-LSC Funds Interferes with Growing State and 
Local Efforts to Expand Access to Justice. 
State and local governmental institutions and private charitable donors 
are essential partners in state justice systems designed to expand access to 
civil justice.  For example, money for civil legal services is contributed by 
Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”),127 state legislative appro-
priations, civil court filing fees, and a variety of other state and local con-
tributions, all intended to enable low-income individuals, families, and 
 
 123. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 124. Laura K. Abel, Drawing Lines for Dollar, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 62, avail-
able at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/DrawingLinesforDollars.pdf. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Federal Policy, [Stem Cell Information], http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/ 
defaultpage.asp (last visited May 15, 2009) (on file with author).  The restrictions on feder-
ally funded stem cell research have since been further eased by the Obama Administration.  
See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Removing-Barriers-to-Responsible-Scientific-
Research-Involving-Human-Stem-Cells/. 
 127. When lawyers hold clients’ funds that are either nominal in amount, or expected to 
be held only for a short term, they must place the funds in an interest-bearing “IOLTA ac-
count.”  Pursuant to state law, the interest from these accounts are pooled (note:  such inter-
est would not exist but for such pooling) and used to fund civil legal aid for low-income 
people and to fund improvements to the justice system.  More information available at 
IOLTA.org Leadership for Greater Justice, http://www.iolta.org/ (last visited Apr. 12 2009). 
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communities to obtain civil legal assistance.128  But, the federal govern-
ment undercuts this important function, by effectively limiting how state 
and local contributions can be spent by local legal aid non-profits. 
The restriction on state, local, and private money currently ties up ap-
proximately $490 million in non-LSC funding annually, much of it from 
these state and local government sources.129  Real federal funding levels 
have declined from the high-water mark achieved in FY 1981.130  Since 
that year, annual federal underfunding of LSC has meant that LSC finances 
less and less of legal services organizations’ work while the restriction con-
tinues to apply federal control over the entirety of those organizations’ ac-
tivities.  Nationally, 58.1% of the funds that go to LSC grantees came from 
non-LSC sources in 2007, up from 40% the year the restriction was en-
acted.131 
The proportion is much more skewed in some states.  In New Jersey, for 
example, LSC funds amounted to only 13% of legal aid programs’ total 
funding in 2007, yet the restriction encumbered the remaining 87%.132  
Overall, LSC grantees in twenty-seven states received less than half of their 
funds from LSC sources in 2006,133 yet the restriction limited what these 
programs could do with all of their funds.  Thus the restriction, coupled 
with funding trends in recent years, has given the federal government in-
creasingly disproportionate control over legal services organizations’ ac-
tivities and over the money of state, local, and private contributors. 
3. Restrictions Waste Precious Resources that Could Go Toward Serving 
More Clients. 
In some states with significant non-LSC funding, justice planners have 
established entirely separate organizations and law offices, funded by state 
and local public funders and by private charitable sources, to carry out the 
 
 128. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FACT BOOK 2006, at 14  
(2007) [hereinafter FACT BOOK 2006], available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/Rinboard/2006 
FactBook.pdf. 
 129. FACT BOOK 2007, supra note 20, at 6. 
 130. JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3, at 2. 
 131. In 2007 dollars, non-LSC funding increased from $276 million in 1996 to $490 mil-
lion in 2007, while LSC funding decreased from $408 million in 1996 to $354 million in 
2007 (dollar amounts adjusted for inflation using CPI Inflation Calculator, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl).  See FACT BOOK 2007, supra note 20, at 6; 1996 LSC, 
supra note 23. 
 132. See FACT BOOK 2006, supra note 128, at 9.  The “legal aid programs” discussed here 
include only those programs that received some LSC funding. 
 133. See id. at 13-14. 
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activities that LSC-funded programs are prohibited from conducting.134  
Because LSC’s program integrity regulation requires physical separation 
between LSC-funded and non-LSC-funded organizations, the costs associ-
ated with overhead, personnel, and administrative expenditures are dupli-
cated.135  Twin systems inevitably cost more to run.  Thus, the restriction 
creates dramatic inefficiencies in a system that is already underfunded.  
The money contributed by state and local governmental funders and by pri-
vate charitable donors could be used to finance basic legal services for 
families, but instead has to be spent on duplicate offices, equipment, execu-
tive directors, and the time spent coordinating their efforts. 
In Oregon, for example, legal aid programs spend approximately 
$300,000 each year on duplicate costs to maintain physically separate of-
fices throughout the state.136 If the restriction on state and local governmen-
tal funds and private money were lifted, the redundant costs could be 
eliminated. The significant savings from ending dual operating systems 
would enable legal services organizations to cover more conventional legal 
services cases—such as evictions, domestic violence cases, and predatory 
lending disputes—in underserved rural parts of the state with limited access 
to legal assistance. 
The restrictions also make LSC-funded organizations ineligible for cer-
tain private funding.  Legal Services NYC has been unable to obtain addi-
tional funds from a local foundation due to the restrictions on its represen-
tation of immigrants.137  Legal Services NYC partners with fourteen 
community-based organizations in an innovative “Single Stop Program” 
that provides legal assistance and social services together at outreach sites 
in community-based organizations around New York City.138  This effort, 
which helps families keep their homes, obtain essential medical care, qual-
ify for emergency food benefits, and more, has been funded by a local anti-
poverty foundation.139 Concerned about the needs of New York’s large 
immigrant population, the foundation added funding to ensure that legal as-
sistance would be provided to immigrants regardless of immigration 
 
 134. See, e.g., Legal Aid Servs. of Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1187 
(D. Or. 2008); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 19 (describing a dual system set up in Philadel-
phia). 
 135. See 45 CFR §1610.5(a) (1997). 
 136. See Legal Aide Servs. of Oregon, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. 
 137. E-mail from Andrew Scherer, Executive Dir., Legal Servs. N.Y.C., to Rebekah Dil-
ler (Feb. 14, 2007, 17:57 EST) (on file with author). 
 138. Legal Servs. NYC, Single Stop, http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=66 (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 139. Id. 
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status.140  Because of the restriction on non-LSC money, however, Legal 
Services NYC could not seek this added funding from the foundation to 
expand this successful community-based outreach program.141 
Finally, as is described supra in Part III.A.1., the restrictions prohibit le-
gal aid organizations from bringing in additional revenue through court-
ordered attorneys’ fee awards when they have proven their case.  All of 
these limits are unjustifiable in a system desperate for funds. 
CONCLUSION 
A growing number of national, state, and local voices have called for re-
form of the legal services restrictions.  Reports by Access to Justice and le-
gal services commissions in eighteen states have identified the restrictions 
as substantial barriers to justice.142  Others have spoken out about the 
harms of the restrictions, and particularly their application to non-LSC 
funds.  Describing a lawsuit filed by Oregon against the “program integrity 
rule,” Governor Ted Kulongoski said: “The important point is that for the 
first time a state is now party to a suit that attempts to free Legal Aid from 
restrictions that serve no purpose other than to close the courthouse door to 
plaintiffs who have no ability to hire private attorneys.”143 
Calls for change have come from across the political spectrum.  In 2005, 
the National Council of the Churches and thirty-one other faith groups 
wrote to House leaders requesting that the restriction on non-LSC funds be 
lifted.144  The next year, the National Association of Evangelicals urged 
Congress to do the same.145  The removal of restrictions has become a pri-
ority for the civil rights community as well.146  The recently introduced 
 
 140. E-mail from Andrew Scherer, supra note 137. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 80. 
 143. Governor Ted Kulongoski, Guardians of Democracy: Public Service and the Rule of 
Law, Robert Abrams Public Service Lecture at NYU Law School (Jan. 23, 2006), available 
at http://www.oregon.gov/Gov/speech/speech_012306.shtml. 
 144. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals, to Senators Richard C. Shelby and Barbara 
A. Mikulski (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-
/d/download_file_36360.pdf; Letter from Prison Fellowship, to Rep. Frank R. Wolf and 
José E. Serrano (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/ 
subpages/letter%20to%20congress%20reentry%20legal%20aid.pdf. 
 145. See Letter from Rev. Richard Cizik, Vice President for Governmental Affairs, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Evangelicals, to Rep. Frank R. Wolf and Rep. Alan B. Mollohan (July 13, 2006) 
(on file with the Brennan Center for Justice). 
 146. See REBEKAH DILLER,  CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, RESTORING LEGAL 
AID FOR THE POOR:  OUR NATION NEEDS A ROBUST LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION (2008), 
available at http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2008/changeforamerica/pdf/legal 
_services.pdf. 
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Civil Access to Justice Act of 2009 would ease the most troubling restric-
tions put in place in 1996.147  And the Obama Administration, in its fiscal 
year 2010 budget, recommended that Congress lift three of the major re-
strictions in the appropriations processes.  Specifically, the President’s 
budget seeks to remove the non-LSC funds restriction and the restrictions 
prohibiting programs from using their LSC funds to participate in class ac-
tions and receive court-awarded attorneys’ fees.148  National groups, along-
side allies from the access to justice, faith, and civil rights communities, 
continue to urge Congress to heed the President’s recommendations and 
remove the most onerous restrictions by fixing the rider language in the 
next LSC appropriation.149 
Finally, the national economic crisis makes correction of the LSC re-
strictions critically important.  With homeowners facing foreclosure at 
alarming rates and thousands of people losing jobs each month, the need 
for legal services is more pressing than ever.150  Correcting the LSC restric-
tions would bring in additional funds and ensure that cases could proceed 
as efficiently as possible.  Revitalization of legal services advocacy would 
protect individuals, families and communities from ongoing harm, and 
would substantially improve the delivery of equal justice in American 
courts. 
 
 147. See S. 718, 111th Cong. (2009)  (eliminating, inter alia, the restriction on non-LSC 
funds and attorneys’ fees and easing limits on class actions, administrative and legislative 
advocacy, and representation of prisoners and documented immigrants.). 
 148. See Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2010 Appendix, at 1243 (May 8, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/appendix.pdf 
 149. See, e.g., Joint letter to Senators Mikulski and Shelby and Representatives Mollohan 
and Wolf (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/090508. 
LegalServicesSign-onLtr.pdf. 
 150. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, Detroit, Stockton, Las Vegas Post Highest 2007 
Metro Foreclosure Rates (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ 
ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=4119&accnt=64847 (report-
ing a 79% increase in the percent of U.S. households filing for foreclosure between 2006 
and 2007).  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that, from March 2007 to March 2009, 
the unemployment rate has risen 4.1% to 8.5%.  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutput 
Servlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000 (last visited May 15, 2009).  
The U.S. Census Bureau reports a 0.2% increase in the number of Americans living at or 
below 125% of the federal poverty line in 2007 as compared to 2006 (not statistically sig-
nificant).  See Bureau of Labor Statistics & U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Social and Eco-
nomic (ASEC) Supplement, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/pov/new01_125_ 
01.htm and http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/pov/new01_125_01.htm (last visited 
May 15, 2009). 
